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Purpose: The purpose of the study is to systematically review and 
examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
restraining earnings management among the listed firms of the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange. 
Research methodology: In this study, we used the modified Jones 
model to calculate discretionary accruals. Our sample comprises 27 
firms covering the period from 2016 to 2018, analyzed by the EGLS 
estimator.  
Results: Our empirical results show that gender diversity, board 
size, and audit committee independence reduce the managers' 
discretion. Simultaneously, we found a significantly positive 
association between earning management and different corporate 
governance characteristics such as CEO duality, institutional 
investor ownership, and family ownership. We do not find any 
evidence that audit committee size, ownership concentration, and 
managerial ownership significantly influence discretionary 
accruals. 
Limitations: This study's main limitation is that we did not address 
the direction of discretionary accruals, which does not allow us to 
detect the motivational aspects behind earnings management.  
Contribution: The results of this study will help Moroccan 
authorities in their formulation of an appropriate regulatory 
framework because very few studies have been conducted in this 
area in the case of the Moroccan listed companies, especially with a 
large set of governance variables as our empirical model.  
Keywords: Accruals, Board of directors, Corporate governance, 
Earnings management, Ownership structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings manipulation is considered one of the most critical issues in financial reporting over the last 
two decades. Large companies' opportunistic management behavior seems to be a major topic of debate 
in the economic and financial world after several financial scandals. When companies such as Enron 
and WorldCom were put in the spotlight in the early 2000s, it was revealed that the management team 
had taken extreme measures to prepare their financial statements. The former CEO of WorldCom, Scott 
Sullivan, publicly stated that he "falsified the financial statements to fulfill analysts' expectations" 
(Bowe, 2005). Faced with intense pressure to achieve the financial numbers predicted by analysts, the 
management team deliberately used several techniques to manage their earnings. Although they are 
widely recognized, both Enron and WorldCom have taken earnings management practice to the law's 
fraudulent extreme. These financial scandals have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust in 
the financial markets. To break away from this environment of mistrust, an inevitable corporate 
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governance reform has been developed that limits managers' opportunistic behavior and undermines 
investors' reliability in financial information. Solid governance mechanisms would reduce opportunistic 
management behavior, thus enhancing financial statements and earnings management reliability and 
quality. On the other hand, an inefficient governance system can encourage manipulation, 
mismanagement, and corruption in the firm (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
 
Morocco is a developing country that needs to attract new suppliers, investors, and lenders. The 
disclosure of the Moroccan companies' results is associated with requirements in terms of corporate 
governance mechanisms and managing earnings”. 
This paper is one of the first attempts to provide evidence on the impact of governance mechanisms on 
earnings management in Moroccan listed companies. Most recent studies have focused on the 
relationship between performance and corporate governance (Sbai and Meghouar, 2017; Belkebir et al. 
2018). While discovering the interplay between corporate governance and earnings management is still 
limited in the Moroccan context, because earlier studies have focused especially on the impact of 
ownership structure on earnings management (El Haddad and Ez-Zarzari, 2017; Farooq and El Jai, 
2012). To address these limitations, we examine the relationship between earnings management and 
corporate governance mechanisms, including both board of directors and ownership structure 
characteristics, following the approach of Kjærland et al. (2020). The study's primary focus is to 
understand that a well-functioning governance system effectively controls the earnings management in 
Moroccan listed companies.  
 
This study's main purposes are to explain the nature of the relationship between earnings management 
and corporate governance mechanisms in the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE). To identify the 
characteristics of corporate governance that have major effects on earnings management and to assess 
the econometric power and relevance of the accrual-based model of Dechow et al. (1995) for detecting 
earnings management in the Moroccan stock market context. 
 
This contribution is structured as follows. After the introduction, in section 1, we examine definitions 
of the concept of earnings management. Section 2 presents the literature on earning management and 
corporate governance characteristics and develops research hypotheses. In section 3, we expose our 
research methodology, sample, and empirical methods, including how we estimate discretionary 
accruals and explanatory variables. Whereas in Section 5, we expose and interpret the main achieved 
empirical results before concluding with some future research suggestions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
An overview of earnings management 
The financial and accounting literature records a variety of definitions of earnings management. The 
most widely cited definition is initiated by Schipper (1989), who defined this practice as a volunteer 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private 
gain. This definition is subject to an opportunistic aspect. It shows that the ultimate objective of earnings 
management is to manage earnings, i.e., to master accounting standards' workings, using the options 
and advantages provided, without exceeding the limit of legality, to improve a company's financial 
situation during a specific period. Earnings management can be led to a signaling objective. Identically 
to Degeorge et al. (1999), who define earnings management as "the use of managerial discretion to 
influence the financial information communicated to stakeholders". 
 
Healy (1985) is the first researcher to mention the term accrual in his paper "The effects of bonus 
schemes on accounting decisions". He noted that the existence of accruals results from the requirements 
of accounting standard setters. Healy (1985) considers two approaches to manage earnings: controlling 
accruals or changing accounting policies (real earnings management). Accruals evaluate all the 
accounting adjustments required to move from a cash basis to an accrual basis accounting. They are 
composed of all income and expenses recorded in the income statement that did not result in any cash 
flows during the year. 
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Corporate governance and earnings management  
Empirical research has focused for decades on the various factors that influence the quality of results. 
This attention has focused primarily on accrual-based earnings management. In the context of the 
importance of corporate governance that has been discussed, several previous studies have investigated 
whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management practices. The argument 
regarding the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management needs to be 
revisited from the point of view of agency theory, which suggests that there should be a distinct 
separation between control and ownership. When an organization's managers do not hold ownership, 
their attitude is influenced by self-interest objectives that are inconsistent with maximizing shareholder 
and stakeholder wealth and increasing the organization's value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Board of directors' characteristics 
Various corporate governance mechanisms help align managers' and shareholders' interests and limit 
the agency costs generated by these managers. The key one is the board of directors. In the context of 
agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) stressed that financial transactions must be supervised, and the 
credibility and validity of these operations are imperative for the board to achieve shareholders' interests 
while protecting their rights. In general, the board of directors has a multitude of characteristics that can 
be used to strengthen the overall management of the firm. 
 
1. Board’s size  
The board of directors can be considered one of the most vital internal control mechanisms affecting 
earnings management. From an agency theory viewpoint, large board size is a tool that reduces agency 
problems. For example, Ghosh et al. (2010) have shown that a large board size allows taking advantage 
of a wide range of its members' experiences and provides more monitoring and control over managers' 
actions. 
 
However, according to Watts's and Zimmerman's (1986) political cost assumption, large firms are likely 
to have more important boards of directors and that such companies will be more politically visible. On 
the other hand, Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1995) found that as board size increases, there is less 
effective supervision of managers, and managers tend to manipulate earnings. 
Overall, the existing literature reveals that board size measured by the total number of directors 
negatively impacts earnings management (Adeolu Abata and Oseko Migiro, 2016; Aygun et al. 2014; 
Ghosh et al. 2010). Based on this, we propose our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.1. There is a significant negative connection between the board of directors' size and the 
earnings management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
2. CEO’s duality   
Stewardship theory and agency theory are the two theoretical explanations for the separation between 
the CEO and the board's chairman. According to agency theory, accumulating the CEO and chairman 
positions does not improve the board's effective vigilance over managerial opportunism. 
These two functions, performed by different people, reduce asymmetric information and agency costs 
and improve corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Differently, the stewardship theory 
stipulates that managers are the best directors of firms, and the manager's duality could help promote 
strong management. 
 
Defenders of the CEO’s duality argue that duality should enhance the financial performance of 
companies because it provides clear leadership to formulate and implement the strategy (Anderson and 
Anthony, 1986). Critics of the CEO's duality argue that the company's board is dominated by the CEO 
when there is duality. To guarantee the board’s effectiveness, it is essential to separate the chairman 
and CEO positions. Similarly, several previous studies have shown that CEO’s duality limits the 
effectiveness of the board in monitoring management behavior (Iraya et al. 2015; Jensen, 1993; Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Molz, 1988; Rajeevan and Ajward, 2019; S. Latif and Abdullah, 2015; Whittington, 
1993). Thus, it is expected that the CEO's duality limits the effectiveness of monitoring management 
behavior in earnings management. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
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Hypothesis 1.2. There is a significant positive interplay between the CEO's duality and the earnings 
management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
3. Board’s independence 
The agency theory stipulates that independent directors add value to firms because of their effective 
oversight role and thus allow them to better perform their role by minimizing the agency costs, which 
potentially could lead to conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). 
In the same vein, Klein (2002) argued that boards dominated by independent directors provide a better 
breadth of knowledge and experience to the firm and better control and monitor the managers. Other 
authors (Iraya et al. 2015; Marra et al. 2011; Rajeevan and Ajward, 2019; S. Latif and Abdullah, 2015) 
confirmed that independent directors’ presence and earnings management are negatively correlated. 
 
In contrast, studies have found that board independence has a significant positive impact on earnings 
management (Adeolu Abata and Oseko Migiro, 2016). Nevertheless, other papers did mention that there 
is an insignificant correlation between board independence and earnings management (Katmon and 
Farooque, 2017; Kent et al. 2010; Ramachandran et al. 2015). 
Based on these theoretical assumptions, it is expected that the board’s independence could create a 
situation of potential conflict of interest and reduce the governance body's ability to carry out its 
missions and governance roles. Therefore, our hypothesis state that: 
Hypothesis 1.3. There is a significant negative connection between the board's independence and the 
earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
4. Audit committee existence 
The ultimate reason for creating an audit committee is to oversee the accounting process and to maintain 
normal communication between the committee and the internal and external auditors. In addition, this 
committee is an essential part of the internal ecosystem of any firm because it helps the governance 
body to achieve the company’s goals while protecting shareholders' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Most studies indicate that an audit committee attached to the governance body mitigates the level of 
earnings management. Indeed, by studying a large sample of 92 U.S. firms under investigation for 
earnings manipulation between April 1982 and December 1992, Dechow et al. (1995) found that the 
existence of an audit committee negatively influences earnings manipulation. 
 
Similarly, Klein (2002) confirms that the audit committee's presence reduces earnings management in 
U.S. firms. Several other researchers also argue that earnings management is less likely in firms with 
active audit committees (Beasley, 1996; Chen and Zhang, 2014; Marra et al. 2011; Peasnell et al. 2005; 
Sae-Lim and Jermsittiparsert, 2019). We, therefore, found it suitable to test this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.4. There is a significant negative connection between the audit committee's existence and 
the earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
5. Audit committee size 
Numerous studies suggest that the audit committee's presence should improve accounting practices 
(Dezoort, 1998). The complexity of a company's financial system requires a substantial effort from 
audit committee members. In other words, an audit committee with a large set of members could 
monitor earnings management. Similarly, Katmon and Farooque (2017) documented that the audit 
committee could detect and resolve the potential problems in the financial reporting process. 
 
The real influence of audit committee size on earnings management is still a debatable question because 
of the mixed empirical results. This plurality of conclusions on the effects of this committee is explained 
by differences in regulatory systems. Each country has different corporate governance codes based on 
its culture, legal system, and politics. 
Some researchers have found a positive relationship (Adeolu Abata and Oseko Migiro, 2016; He and 
Yang, 2014). In comparison, others have found a negative connection (Ghosh et al. 2010; Lubis and 
Adhariani, 2019; Rajeevan and Ajward, 2019; Sierra García et al. 2012). To be consistent with this 
reasoning, our study hypothesizes the following: 
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Hypothesis 1.5. There is a significant negative connection between the audit committee size and the 
earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
6. Audit committee independence  
An audit committee's existence is not necessarily sufficient to mitigate earnings management in some 
cases. Ensuring the effectiveness of the audit committee's monitoring role depends on the committee’s 
organizational structure. Indeed, Vicknair et al. (1993) argue that the audit committee's independence 
is one of the vital elements that affect management in companies because the presence of independent 
auditors affiliated within the committee helps in absorbing managers’ pressure on internal auditors. 
 
Many researchers have studied the relationship between audit committee independence and accrual-
based earnings management. These studies find that independent auditors who do not have any personal 
incentives are considered more effective monitors because they can constrain the managers' discretion 
(Chen and Zhang, 2014; Davidson et al. 2005; Ghosh et al. 2010; Rajeevan and Ajward, 2019; Sharma 
and Kuang, 2014; Xie et al. 2003; S. Latif and Abdullah, 2015).  
 
To this end, the present study hypothesizes that independent auditors’ existence can mitigate any 
company earnings management level. This assumption is consistent with the reasoning above. Also, it 
is essential to highlight that most recent papers have found a negative association between this pair of 
variables.  
Hypothesis 1.6. There is a significant negative interplay between the audit committee independence 
and the earnings management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
7. Audit committee expertise  
Audit committee expertise is used to assess the committee's ability to identify financial flaws and 
manipulations, such as earnings management. Financial research is very necessary for audit committee 
members to maintain focus on the company's financial reports. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) 
argue that companies are less likely to face financial problems when financial experts are present on 
their audit committees. 
 
Auditors with financial expertise are in a superior position to monitor the financial statements' integrity. 
They have similar analytical techniques to external auditors in terms of processing financial reports, 
which has a positive impact on their oversight judgment, requires better quality audits, and helps 
facilitate effective communication with internal and external auditors on oversight issues (Alzeban and 
Sawan, 2015; Lary and Taylor, 2012). The experience factor is one of the most important determinants 
of detecting and understanding earnings management strategies.  
 
Literature examining audit committee expertise, such as (Chen and Zhang, 2014; He and Yang, 2014; 
Lubis and Adhariani, 2019; Sharma and Kuang, 2014; Xie et al. 2003) reveal that an audit committee 
with financial experts mitigates earnings management. Consequently, our hypothesis was established 
according to the explanation above:  
Hypothesis 1.7. There is a significant negative connection between the audit committee expertise and 
the earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
8. Gender diversity  
Recently, one aspect of governance structure that has received increasing attention is gender diversity. 
It is common in business management that women are less risks taking managers, especially in financial 
decisions. Systematically that means that they are not likely to engage in unethical behavior to gain 
private benefits (Khazanchi, 1995; Powell and Ansic, 1997). 
 
Previous research papers have studied this factor using the number or percentage of female directors 
actively operating within the governance body by examining the relationship between their presence 
within the board composition and earnings management (Alqatan, 2019; Debnath and Roy, 2019; Kyaw 
et al. 2015; Mnif and Cherif, 2020; Triki Damak, 2018). These researchers showed that earnings 
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manipulation is lower in companies with higher female board representation. They argued that 
differences in gender, moral values, and female incentives have important implications for financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance. We, therefore, propose our eighth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.8. There is a significant negative relationship between gender diversity and the earnings 
management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
Ownership structure characteristics 
The ownership structure is seen as another vital factor linked to a variety of accounting issues such as 
corporate financial performance, earnings quality, and earnings management. Theoretical arguments on 
the interplay between ownership structure and accounting information are based on Jensen's and 
Meckling's (1976) theory. These authors have argued that the separation of ownership and control leads 
to agency costs because of the highly present self-serving behavior of managers, leading to a conflict 
of interest with the original shareholders. The connection between ownership structure and earnings 
management has attracted important attention in the recent financial literature. Different dimensions of 
ownership structure have been tested in previous studies. 
 
1. Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration could be defined as a measure of large shareholders' existence in a firm 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). For Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership concentration is a vital 
control mechanism for solving problems between the agent and the principal. However, several authors 
consider it risky because it allows the largest shareholders to use the firm's resources for their interests. 
Belhadj et al. (2016) highlighted the positive influence of ownership concentration on discretionary 
accruals, which are a proxy for earnings management. On the other hand, Waweru and Riro (2013) 
showed that ownership concentration impedes earnings quality because it increases discretionary 
accruals. In this sense, many studies have shown the positive effect of ownership concentration on 
earnings management level (Adeolu Abata and Oseko Migiro, 2016; Belhadj et al. 2016; Waweru and 
Riro, 2013). On this basis, we hypothesis the following idea: 
Hypothesis 2.1. There is a significant positive connection between ownership concentration and 
earnings management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
2. Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors play an active role in supervising managerial discretion and enhancing 
information efficiency in worldwide capital markets (Balsam et al. 2003). 
Indeed, Carleton et al. (1998) argue that a greater presence of institutional investors increases 
monitoring efficiency and owners’ capabilities in controlling firms. Therefore, this type of ownership 
is an important governance mechanism for monitoring in depth the behavior of managers. In the same 
vein, Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014) uphold the argument that an increase in institutional 
ownership should positively impact a firm’s behavior, as managers would be discouraged from doing 
earnings management due to pressure from institutional investors. In the same path, several authors 
have shown a negative connection between institutional investors’ presence and earnings management 
(Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Lel, 2013; Shah and Shah, 2014). Thus, we could propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.2. There is a significant negative interplay between institutional ownership and the 
earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
3. Managerial ownership 
Agency theory proposes that when executives do not hold shares in the firm they manage or only hold 
a small percentage of that enterprise, their actions are influenced by their personal motivations, which 
could differ from the firm’s main financial goals and, therefore, shareholders’ interests, making of 
earnings management a common practice inside the firm (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Specifically, if the managerial part of the firm’s capital presents a significant 
portion of the CEOs' personal investments, they would be more likely to gradually align their personal 
interests with those of shareholders and exhibit lower discretionary accruals (Jung and Kwon, 2002). 
On the other hand, Warfield et al. (1995) empirically demonstrated that managerial ownership is 
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contrarily related to discretionary accruals. In this sense, Anwar and Buvanendra (2019); Ekpulu and 
Omoye, (2018), and Saleem Salem Alzoubi (2016) found a significantly negative correlation between 
managerial ownership and earnings management. 
Hypothesis 2.3. There is a significant negative connection between managerial ownership and the 
earnings management level of Moroccan-listed companies. 
 
4. Family ownership 
Family ownership brings together the founder or family members (i.e., an employee or a manager as a 
group) (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Studies on the effect of family ownership control are the subject 
of a lively debate. Two different views emerge from this dichotomy. The first point of view stipulates 
that a founding family with a long-term vision will limit managers' ability to manipulate earnings. In 
contrast, this configuration could potentially lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders' interests 
(Jaggi et al. 2009). In other words, family businesses are more likely to deal with agency problems 
arising from the conflict between the major block-holders and the minor shareholders. 
 
Theoretically, a high level of family ownership can amplify agency problems due to the expropriation 
of minority shareholders' interests, which lead in consequence to a positive influence on earnings 
management, as shown by several studies (La Rosa et al. 2020; Sadjiarto et al. 2019; Saleem Salem 
Alzoubi, 2016). We, therefore, propose our final conceptual hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.4. There is a significant positive connection between family ownership and the earnings 
management level of Moroccan listed companies. 
 
3. Research methodology 
Following a pure positivist epistemological posture as defined by Thiétart et al. (2014), and adopting a 
fully quantitative research methodology. We conducted this study based on a balanced data panel of 27 
firms over three years from 2016 to 2018, for a total of 81 observations with approximately 14 corporate 
governance characteristics for each observation. This study focuses on generating new evidence 
regarding the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Morocco, using 
more recent data than previous papers. The data is collected manually from yearly reports, financial 
statements, reference documents available on the CSE website and the Moroccan Capital Markets 
Authority (MCMA) online platform. After assembling the data panel with Microsoft EXCEL 2019, we 
used Stata 16 and EViews 11 to perform the empirical analyses. 
 
Sample selection 
Our study population consists of all listed firms on the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) between 
2016 and 2018, except 32 firms with missing data and two other companies that ended their stock 
market journey during the study period. All financial firms were excluded from the sample due to their 
distinct regulatory environment, especially in terms of corporate governance and accounting methods, 
making it challenging to estimate discretionary accruals (Davidson et al. 2005; Katmon and Farooque, 
2015; Mnif and Cherif, 2020). The following table presents the process of sampling and selection of 
the listed companies in our final sample: 
 
Table 1. Sample selection process 
Sample selection Number 
Total number of companies listed on the CSE in 2018 76 
Unlisted companies at 2015 2 
= Total number of companies attending during 2015-2018 74 
Companies operating in the financial sector 
(6 banks) 
(5 insurances) 
(4 financing companies) 
15 
Companies with no governance information 32 
= Final sample 27 
Source: Authors' own. 
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In terms of sector types, building and construction materials, food processing and production, and 
distribution sectors are the sectors with the highest percentage of the sample, with a percentage about 
15% (4 companies for each sector) with a weight of 44.44% of the final sample. Followed by 
participation and real estate promotion, representing 11% of the sample (3 companies). The petroleum-
gas and lubricants and the trade and transport sectors represent 7% of the sample (2 companies). In 
contrast, the remaining sectors represent the smallest proportion, respectively 4% of the sample 
companies. 
 
Model design  
The current study uses earnings management as a dependent variable since it is a typical proxy of 
earnings management in the accounting literature. Discretionary accruals will be used as a measure for 
earnings management, and the magnitude of discretionary accruals is included as estimated residuals 
from the modified Jones model (Xie et al. 2003; Katmon and Farooque, 2017, Ben Ayed-Koubaa, 
2010). 
 
The first step in calculating discretionary accruals is to estimate total accruals. Total accruals are defined 
in this study as the difference between the net income of a year and the cash flow from operating 
activities scaled by the lagged total assets. 
𝐓𝐀𝐂𝐂𝐢𝐭 = 𝐍𝐈𝐢𝐭 − 𝐂𝐅𝐎𝒊𝒕 
Where the variable 𝐓𝐀𝐂𝐂𝐢𝐭 refers to the total accruals of firm i at time t, the variable 𝐍𝐈𝐢𝐭 is the net 
income of firm i at time t, and 𝐂𝐅𝐎𝒊𝒕 refers to the cash flow from operations. 
 
Total accruals are separated into discretionary (abnormal) accruals generated by earnings management 
and non-discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are normal for the company and fluctuate 
with its level of performance and business strategy, and other economic factors, while discretionary 
accruals are creatively generated by earnings management during the preparation of financial statements 
using accounting policy choices and accounting estimates (Healy, 1985). 
 
In a second step, we will calculate the discretionary accruals according to the model of Dechow et al. 






) + 𝒂𝟐 (
𝚫𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊,𝒕 − 𝚫𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊,𝒕
𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + 𝒂𝟑 (
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
) + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
 
Where the variable Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 presents the revenue’s changes (Credit Sales) for the company (i) during 
period (t); Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the changes in accounts receivable for the company (i) during period (t); 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
is Property, Plant and Equipment; the variable 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1is the total assets for the enterprise (i) at the period 
(t-1); and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term. 
In this step, discretionary accruals (𝑫𝑨𝑪𝑪𝐢,𝐭) are obtained by the difference between total accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals estimated using the parameters of the modified Jones model of Dechow et 
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Since we are looking for the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management, 
absolute values are used to measure earnings management, whether earnings management is used to 
decrease or increase earnings, thus capturing the combined effect of both types of earnings management 
(Ben Ayed-Koubaa, 2009; Katmon and Farooque, 2017; Xie et al. 2003). Thus, our study examines the 
magnitude of earnings management, not its direction. 
Our model is therefore as follows: 
(𝑫𝑨𝑨𝑪)𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎 +    𝟏 (𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊,𝒕 +  𝟐(𝑫𝑼𝑨𝑳)𝒊,𝒕 +   𝟑(𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷)𝒊,𝒕 +  𝟒(𝑪𝑶𝑴)𝒊,𝒕
+   𝟓(𝑨𝑪𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒊,𝒕 +   𝟔(𝑨𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑫)𝒊,𝒕 +  𝟕(𝑨𝑪𝑬𝑿𝑷)𝒊,𝒕 +   𝟖(𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑹)𝒊,𝒕
+   𝟗 (𝑪𝑶𝑵)𝒊,𝒕  +   𝟏𝟎 (𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻)𝒊,𝒕 +   𝟏𝟏 (𝑴𝑨𝑵𝑮)𝒊,𝒕 +   𝟏𝟐 (𝑭𝑨𝑴)𝒊,𝒕
+   𝟏𝟑(𝒍𝒏_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆)𝒊,𝒕  +   𝟏𝟒(𝑹𝑶𝑨)𝒊,𝒕  +   𝟏𝟓(𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚)𝒊,𝒕   +  𝝁𝒊 + 𝒗𝒕+ 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
 




Table 2. Description of explanatory and control variables 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
4. Results and discussions 
In order to establish an empirical model in the Moroccan context, we are going to present in this section 
our empirical results.  
 
Descriptive statistics  




Variables Acronyms Measures Signs References 
Board of director's characteristics 
Board's size SIZE 
The number of directors inside the 
governance body 
(-) 
Aygun et al. (2014); Adeolu Abata and 
Oseko Migiro (2016); Ghosh et al. 
(2010) 
CEO's duality DUAL 
Binary variable worth 1" when there is a 
duality and "0" when there is a separation 
of functions. 
(+) 
Forker (1992); S. Latif and Abdullah 
(2015); Iraya et al. (2015) 
Board's 
independence 
INDEP % of independent directors.  (-) 
Marra et al. (2011); S. Latif and 
Abdullah (2015); Iraya et al. (2015);  
Rajeevan and Ajward (2019) 
Existence of an 
audit committee 
COM 
Binary variable coded 1 if the firm has an 
audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
 (-) 
Beasley (1996); Peasnell et al. (2005); 
Sae-Lim and Jermsittiparsert (2019); 




The total number of permanent auditors on 
the audit committee. 
(-) 
Rajeevan and Ajward (2019); Lubis and 




% of independent directors inside the audit 
committee. 
(-) 
Sharma and Kuang (2014); Kent et al. 
(2010); S. Latif and Abdullah (2015); 




A dichotomous variable takes the value 1 
if there is an accounting/financial 
professional inside the audit committee 
and 0 otherwise. 
(-) 
He and Yang (2014); Sharma and Kuang 
(2014); Lubis and Adhariani (2019) 
Gender 
diversity 
GENDER % of women on the board of directors. (-) 
Mnif and Cherif (2020); Kyaw et al. 
(2015); Alqatan (2019); Debnath and 
Roy (2019); Triki Damak (2018) 
Ownership structure characteristics 
Ownership 
concentration 
CON (1) absence; (2) minority; (3) majority (+) 
Waweru and Riro (2013); Adeolu Abata 




INST % of capital held by institutional investors (-) 
Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011); Lel (2013); 
Shah and Shah (2014) 
Managerial 
ownership 
MANG % of shares held by directors. (-) 
Saleem Salem Alzoubi (2016); Ekpulu 
and Omoye (2018) 
Family 
ownership 
FAM % of shares held by family members. (+) 
Sadjiarto et al. (2019); Saleem Salem 
Alzoubi (2016); La Rosa et al. (2020) 
Control variables 
ROA ROA 𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
  Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014) 
Profitability PROF 𝑇𝑃 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
  Katmon and Farooque (2015) 
Company size LN_SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets.  
Shah and Shah (2014); Davidson et al. 
(2005) 
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Table 3. Summary of descriptive statistics 




MJM_1995 81 0,05712 0,044851 0,0002875 0,2476018 
SIZE 81 7,938 2.624 3 14 
DUAL 81 0,593 0.494 0 1 
INDEP 81 14,626 % 0.234 0 80% 
COM 81 0,84 0.369 0 1 
ACSIZE 81 2,667 1.5 0 6 
ACIND 81 21,893% 0.37 0 1 
GENDER 81 10,585 % 0.099 0 33,333% 
CON 81 2,617 0.561 1 3 
INST 81 58,629 % 0.305 0 99,72% 
MANG 81 11,10 % 0.198 0 57,01% 
FAM 81 14,79 % 0.261 0 100% 
LN_SIZE 81 22,218 1.375 19.402 25.427 
PROF 81 7,948 % 0.107 34,976% 28,98% 
ROA 81 3,628 % 0.044 -16,513% 15,748% 
Source: Authors’ own (Stata 16). 
 
Table 3 shows that the average board size (SIZE) is 7.938. This result is in line with the requirements 
of Law No. 17-95, updated by Law No. 20-05, relating to the public limited companies, which stipulate 
that listed companies' board size must be between 3 and 15 directors. Nevertheless, companies 
undergoing restructuring operations benefit from a higher quota if they are listed.  However, the mean 
value of audit committee independence is low at 21.89%, which indicates that it increases the possibility 
for executives to engage in earnings management practices. These results are confirmed by Saleh et al. 
(2005).  
 
On the other hand, the absence of audit committees in some Moroccan listed companies could be the 
potential reason for the insignificant regression results related to the characteristics of audit committees 
in Moroccan listed companies compared to other countries, knowing that the regulatory framework 
states that every listed firm must have an audit committee. For ownership structure, family ownership 
(FAM) followed an upward trend over the three years of the study, with an average of 14.79%, a 
minimum of 0, and a maximum of 100%. Empirical studies suggest that a significant percentage of 
family ownership will create agency conflicts and higher earnings management. 
 
The correlation matrix reveals a very high correlation up to 1 between COM and ACEXP, in other 
words, an identical and perfect correlation. It alerts us of the existence of a potential multicollinearity 
problem. An additional test of Vector Inflation Factor (VIF) shows the validation of our predictions on 
the existence of the problem mentioned above. Therefore, the elimination of one of the variables objects 
of the problem is primordial and imperative. Therefore, the ACEXP variable has been eliminated from 
the study because of the COM variable's high representativeness and importance. 
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Discretionary accruals estimation 
Table 5 presents the regression results for MJM_1995. With a Fisher statistic of (8.138) significant at a 
1% level, we could conclude that the model is well specified. In contrast, the coefficient of 
determination highlights the imperfect goodness of fit. However, this does not represent an obstacle for 
our study since we are interested in studying the effects of governance mechanisms on earnings 
management and not the reliability test of the MJM_1995 regression. Besides, it should be noted that 
this model does not contain a constant, which may explain the results obtained. Thus, the p-values show 
that the model is correctly specified, and the variables are significant except for the term2 variable. 
  
The estimated coefficient for term2 that attempts to measure the difference between the variation in 
revenue and the change in accounts receivable is insignificant. Contrary to the theoretical stipulations, 
table 5 shows the lack of importance of accounting policies related to accounts receivable in CSE-listed 
companies since the inclusion of this variable does not significantly improve the model fit and the 
representativeness of the coefficients. However, the probability associated with the term1 coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level, while term3 has a significant variation at the 1% level.  
 
Table 5. Estimation of MJM_1995 
TACC_2  Coef.  Standard 
deviation 
 t-value  p-value  [95% 
Conf 
 Interval] 
 term1 -20100000 9320000 -2.16 0.034 -38600000 -1540000 
 term2 -0.026 0.083 -0.32 0.753 -0.192 0.139 
 term3 -0.064 0.021 -3.11 0.003 -0.106 -0.023 
Mean dependent var -0.045 SD dependent var  0.070  
R²  0.238 Observations  81.000  
Fisher-test   8.138 Prob > F  0.000  
Source: Authors' own (Stata 16).  
Where,  
Tacc_2 = (NI- CFO) /l.Totalassets 
Term1 = 1/l.Totalassets; 
Term2 = (.REV - REC) /l.Actiftotal ; 
Term3 = PPE/l.Totalassetsl. 
 
 
Main results and findings  
This study used a panel data methodology to study the relation between earnings management and 
corporate governance mechanisms. For our part, we chose to use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method. Table 6 shows that the OLS regression results have a significant Fisher test probability at a 1% 
level, indicating that our model is well specified. The results show that only three variables are 
significant at a 1% level, including INST, FAM, and ROA, under a coefficient of determination of 
29.2%. In terms of autocorrelation, we used the Durbin-Watson test. This test allows us to verify the 
existence of autocorrelation of the first order errors. It is based on the estimation of a first-order 
autoregressive model for the estimated residuals. The result of this test is not conclusive (interval of 
doubt) because its value is within the interval (dL1.222 and dU1.913) at the 1% significance level 
according to the Durbin-Watson Significance Table. To test the homoscedasticity hypothesis, we used 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, which showed high significance, leading us to reject the null 
hypothesis, based on the idea that the variance of error terms is constant, thus, a heteroscedasticity 
problem.  
 
Similarly, the residuals normality test frequently used in the empirical literature by Jarque-Bera 
provides information on the residuals' non-normality with a significant probability at the 1% threshold. 
Adding to this, the fact that the Shapiro-Wilk test carried out using Stata 16 confirms the same results 
of the Jarque-Bera test, a probability of less than 5% of this test leads us to reject the null hypothesis, 
which stipulates the existence of a normal variation. Finally, we tested the residual autocorrelation 
problem's presence through the Wooldridge test of the first-order autocorrelation. This test 
recommended that we reject the null hypothesis concerning the absence of a first-order autocorrelation 
 
2021 | International Journal of Financial, Accounting, and Management/ Vol 3 No 3, 205-225 
217 
 
between the error terms and our model's explanatory variables. As a result, the OLS model suffers from 
violations of these assumptions of normality of residuals, homogeneity, and autocorrelation absence.  
We have determined that the random effects model is the most appropriate to our dataset using the 
Hausman test on Stata 16, which showed a (χ2 = 10.39; p=0.7333) accepting the specification’s null 
hypothesis.  
 
It appeared that the Wald test indicates the existence of some heteroscedasticity between the sample 
individuals, as the probability is significant at the 1% level, which leads us to reject the null hypothesis 
that the panel data is homoscedastic. Therefore, we must indeed take heteroscedasticity into account for 
our regression to be theoretically and empirically valid. We directly correct this problem on the EViews 
software by choosing the EGLS method, which considers the existing heteroscedasticity in our model. 
With a coefficient of determination of 53.87%, our model has a good quality of fit with an adjusted 
coefficient of determination of 44.08% and a highly significant Fisher's test probability, which indicates 
the excellent degree of specification of our final model excluding the variable experience of the audit 
committee, that presented a perfect correlation with the variable existence of the audit committee, which 
contributes to the integration of multicollinearity effects. 
 
The Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test for the EGLS regression reported in the following table is still 
inconclusive because the value of 1.79 is within the range of the tabulated values of (dL1.222 and 
dU1.913). The value 1.79 is close to 2, which leads us to conclude that our model almost qualifies for 
non-autocorrelation of errors. These results are expected because we are in the presence of a time-
dependent model. Thus, the residuals’ normality diagnosis by the Jarque-Bera method indicates that 
they have a normal distribution because of the insignificant probability (above 5%), which leads us to 
accept the null hypothesis of residuals normality. 
 
Finally, our model shows promising validity signs. Therefore, the results from the EGLS estimator are 
reliable and empirically valid than other methods' estimators. 
 







Constant -0.063 -0.945 -0.077 -0.0031137 
 (-0.64) (-0.76) (-0.60) (-0.05032) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002542* 
 (-0.22) (-0.94) (-0.21) (-1.961834) 
DUAL 0.013 0.048 0.012 0.015404** 
 (1.02) (1.60) (0.80) (2.158989) 
INDEP 0.036 0.039 0.045 0.040592* 
 (0.90) (0.19) (0.89) (1.973289) 
COM 0.038 0.068 0.056* 0.030494** 
 (1.42) (1.40) (1.86) (2.071305) 
GENDER -0.064 -0.045 -0.049 -0.104419*** 
 (-1.21) (-0.23) (-0.77) (-3.160899) 
INST 0.100*** 0.113 0.096*** 0.083841*** 
 (3.71) (0.67) (2.83) (5.854421) 
CON -0.007 -0.030 -0.011 0.002427 
 (-0.62) (-0.30) (-0.77) (0.318922) 
ACSIZE -0.008 -0.023* -0.014* -0.005098 
 (-1.28) (-1.75) (-1.85) (-1.521108) 
ACIND -0.015 -0.031 -0.024 -0.018779* 
 (-0.76) (-0.66) (-1.01) (-1.830856) 
MANG -0.005 0.095 -0.003 -0.028376 
 (-0.10) (0.16) (-0.05) (-1.092306) 
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FAM 0.066** -0.011 0.044 0.049177*** 
 (2.23) (-0.07) (1.27) (3.098801) 
LN-SIZE 0.002 0.048 0.004 -0.000375 
 (0.41) (0.77) (0.56) (-0.112486) 
PROF -0.015 -0.041 -0.020 -0.004666 
 (-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.110491) 
ROA 0.454** 0.190 0.320* 0.443851*** 
 (2.45) (0.85) (1.79) (3.814927) 
N 81 81 81 81 
R² (Overall R²) 0.292 0.231 (0.263) 0.538733 
R² Ajusté  0.142 - - 0.440889 
Chi-square - - 17.018 - 
F-test 1.947** 0.860 - 5.506*** 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.309107 - - 1.794313 
Chi (2) de Breusch-Pagan 43.83*** - - - 
Jarque-Bera des résidus 38.09548*** - - 4.662918* 
Probability of Wald test        
(χ2 = 27) 
- - 0.0000 - 
(p-value) de Shapiro-Wilk  0.00109 - - - 
Wooldridge-test  6.237** - - - 
t-statistics in brackets. 
*** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10% 
Source: Authors' own (Stata 16 and EViews 11). 
The findings reveal significant differences in the way corporate governance characteristics constrain 
earnings management in listed companies on CSE. The overall results of the study will upon be 
discussed and commented. 
 
The results show that board size has a negatively significant effect on the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals (β= -0.002542; p=0.0540). This result is identical to the findings of Adeolu Abata and Oseko 
Migiro (2016), Aygun et al. (2014), Ghosh et al. (2010), and Xie et al. (2003), who suggested that a 
large number of directors on the board would most likely eliminate the use of accruals to manipulate 
earnings. Indeed, the board members' overcrowding can easily control and monitor CEOs’ actions 
because of the overall enhanced board’s skills and experience. To this end, our (hypothesis 1.1) was 
therefore supported. 
 
In terms of the CEO's duality, our findings show that this variable can only support the idea that CEOs 
who also chair the board of directors can be highly involved in earnings management (β= 0.015404; 
p=0.0345). This result is in line with the arguments of Dechow et al. (1996), Forker (1992), Iraya et al. 
(2015), and S. Latif and Abdullah (2015), who postulated that the presence of a single figurehead 
holding both positions could undermine best corporate governance practices. Thus, top management 
perceives the CEO as having more leeway. Since listed companies have heavy operations and 
accounting records, the CEO's duality would imply that the CEO controls a large volume of information. 
This may be a vehicle to produce fraudulent financial statements and manage earnings to reflect a good 
corporate image. Our (hypothesis 1.2), stating that CEO duality positively impacts earnings 
management, is therefore accepted.  
 
The findings revealed that the independence of the governance body is positively correlated with 
earnings management (β= 0.040592; p= 0.0527). Our results are consistent with those of Adeolu Abata 
and Oseko Migiro (2016). Indeed, independent directors' appointment allows the firm to benefit from a 
greater breadth of their knowledge and experiences. However, this does not demonstrate that the board 
of directors' independence reduces earnings management's impact. The presence of independent 
directors on the governance body can be a way to legitimize the structure of its composition to dissuade 
the financial markets on the quality of supervision within the company. In different words, it is a tool 
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for signaling to the markets through the appointment of independent members to the governance body, 
since theoretically, their presence contributes significantly to the dissolution of existing coalitions in 
the governance body. However, for their presence to be effective, the percentage of these directors 
should not exceed the first third of the board of directors' size, according to the recommendations of 
Law No. 20-19. This may explain why their presence will positively impact earnings management (the 
average board independence is low, with a value of 14.62%). Our (hypothesis 1.3) is accordingly 
rejected.  
 
To identify the audit committee's characteristics, we incorporated the audit committee's different 
attributes, such as their presence, size, and independence. We notice that an audit committee's presence 
favors earnings management level with (β=0.030494; p=0.0422). This result is not aligned with our 
hypothesis 1.4, which states that an audit committee's presence has a negative impact on earnings 
management. Our hypothesis is thus rejected. Furthermore, the audit committee size (β= -0.005098; 
p=0.1330) has a negative but insignificant effect on earnings management. This allows us also to reject 
(hypothesis 1.5). This result indicates that firms adhere more to the laws’ form rather than to their 
substance. However, the audit committee's independence may play a role in limiting earnings 
management. It is noted that there is a significant negative relationship between audit committee 
independence (ACIND) and earnings management (β= -0.018779; p= 0.0716), in line with (hypothesis 
1.6), audit committees that have a higher value of independent directors have lower earnings 
management. Independent audit committee members provide a greater range of knowledge and 
experience to the company and enhance its monitoring effectiveness, which reduces the likelihood of 
corporate failure and financial fraud. However, independent audit committee members are considered 
effective supervisors because they have no personal incentives and can withstand managerial pressure 
to maintain independent judgment while constraining discretionary accruals. Also, independent 
directors have an incentive to maintain their reputation in the marketplace as competent and independent 
professionals and do not want to be exposed to potential litigation and the loss of their seats on the 
board. 
 
Our study results also show that women's presence on the board mitigates earnings management (β=-
0.104419; p= 0.0024). This result is in agreement with those of Alqatan (2019), Debnath and Roy 
(2019), Kyaw et al. (2015), Mnif and Cherif (2020), and Triki Damak (2018). Indeed, women on the 
board of directors are more motivated. In general, they have moral values that reduce corporate earnings 
management because they do not engage in such practices and strategies. Consistent with agency theory, 
gender diversity indirectly enhances the effectiveness of the governance body in terms of creating 
shareholder value by reducing agency costs (Dalton et al. 1998; John and Senbet, 1998). However, 
women's presence in Moroccan listed companies' governance body remains low, with an average of 
10.585%. Still, female executives play an important role in ethical financial reporting, even in a male-
dominated culture. In this regard, a crucial implication of our study is that the decision to appoint 
females directors to corporate boards should be based on specific criteria (e.g., financial or accounting 
expertise, business expertise, and control skills) and not the blind and random implementation of gender 
quotas. Thus, we can confirm our (hypothesis 1.8) that women's presence on the board of directors 
reduces the level of earnings management. 
 
There is a positive connection between earnings management and institutional ownership through 
increased discretionary accruals (β=0.083841; p= 0.0000). The reasoning behind this finding can be 
found in Matsumoto (2002), who argues that institutional investors induce managers to adopt earnings 
management strategies to avoid unexpected negative earnings and instead provide higher regular 
earnings. Indeed, institutional investors can act directly on the interplay between earnings management 
and a firm’s activities, reducing and eliminating suspicious earnings. However, another perspective 
suggests that institutional investors are "transient investors" who focus on short-term results and 
pressure management to deliver higher and more consistent results. Thus, transitional institutional 
investors can exchange control for liquidity. Our findings carry an important implication of designating 
long-term institutional investors rather than transitional institutional investors to increase the possibility 
of oversight and owners' effectiveness in controlling management behavior and thus discourage 
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earnings management. We, therefore, reject (hypothesis 2.2) because the results indicate that 
institutional ownership is positively linked to the use of discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent 
with Cornett et al. (2008), Matsumoto (2002), Obigbemi et al. (2016) and S. Latif and Abdullah (2015). 
We also note the positive effect of family ownership on earnings management (β=0.049177; p= 0.0029). 
Our results recorded high family ownership shares, with an average of 14.79% and a maximum of 
100%. This can be explained by family members' behavior, who may take advantage of the firm by 
holding important positions inside the firm. This could give rise to agency conflicts due to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders' interests and thus favor the level of earnings management. We, 
therefore, accept our (hypothesis 2.4) that family ownership positively impacts the level of earnings 
management. Our results confirm those of La Rosa et al. (2020), Sadjiarto et al. (2019) and Saleem 
Salem Alzoubi, (2016). 
 
The results also indicate that the ownership concentration variable positively impacts earnings 
management but not significantly (β=0.002427; p=0.7508). It is noted that ownership concentration is 
not expected to impact shareholders' perception of accounting earnings and does not impact earnings 
management. These results corroborate with those of Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014) and 
Shah and Shah (2014). This allows us to reject our (hypothesis 2.1), which states that ownership 
concentration has a significant and positive impact on earnings management. 
 
We also note that managerial ownership has a negative but insignificant effect on earnings management 
level (β=-0.028376; p= 0.2787). These results are consistent with El Moslemany and Nathan (2019), 
who reported that managerial ownership does not significantly impact the level of earnings 
management. Therefore, we reject our hypothesis 2.3, according to which managerial ownership has a 
significantly negative impact on earnings management. 
 
The coefficient related to firm performance (ROA) is significantly positive for the control variables at 
the 1% level, on the earnings management level, and the degree of correlation between MJM 1995 and 
ROA is 0.276. This provides information about the increase in performance that may be related to high 
earnings management. This can be explained by the informational perspective that views earnings 
management as a signaling tool to financial markets. Managers often manipulate earnings at their 
discretion to mislead about the firm's economic performance and create wealth for shareholders. 
However, company size and profitability do not have a significant influence on earnings management. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study's main objective is to observe the interplay between Moroccan corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management to improve financial statements' credibility and reduce earnings 
management activities. The motivation for this study is the contrast between theory and empirical 
evidence. By studying a panel of 27 listed firms between 2016 and 2018, we have highlighted significant 
differences in how governance mechanisms impact earnings management.  
 
Most board characteristics are significantly linked to earnings management, except audit committee 
size. The results show that there are Moroccan listed companies that do not have an audit committee. 
However, the audit committee's independence is one of the audit committee's vital features, which 
controls managerial discretion and limits earnings management activities. Our results also show that 
combining between the CEO and chairman roles results in high earnings management levels. We also 
find that board independence promotes earnings management, and the women’s presence on the board 
contributes to a lower earnings management level. The regression results also show that ownership 
structure characteristics such as family ownership and institutional investors' presence favor earnings 
management. 
 
This study's findings provide an overview and commentary that can be useful to regulators, standard 
setters, and researchers in formulating new policies and improving corporate governance practices in 
listed companies on the CSE, and developing a better framework for all stakeholders involved in 
financial reporting. 
 




Limitation and study forward 
This study has some limitations that complicate the generalization of the obtained empirical results. 
Namely, the total sample size restricted the scope of the study. Unfortunately, the sample size was much 
smaller than the initial sample, including all listed companies on the CSE. The selection of firms 
consists of all non-financial listed companies for the period 2016-2018. The study can be conducted 
across all sectors to address this obstacle and make a comparative approach between listed and unlisted 
companies to consider other factors more present at small and medium companies. Another limitation 
of this paper is that the research did not address how discretionary accruals evolve, which allows for 
the detection of motivational aspects of earnings management. This could be of significant interest for 
any future research on this topic. 
 
Overall, the potential for further research on this topic is hence infinite. Many small changes can be 
made to the research model. Adding qualitative variables by interviewing internal auditors to enhance 
the model’s efficiency could lead to significant results to understand the dynamics of this common 
financial problem. Nevertheless, the current research’s results already provide a better understanding 
of the interplay between governance mechanisms and earnings management. 
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